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652 PEOPLE v. BOYLES [45 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5766. In Bank. Nov. 29, 1955.] 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. MAXINE ANN BOYLES, 
Respondent . 
• 
(1] OriminaJ Law-Evidence-Evidence Wrongfully Obtained.-
Where officers waited and watched for someone to enter a 
hotel room, and one of them grabbed defendant's hands as she 
entered the room and found bin dies of heroin in one hand, 
any trespass on their part was entirely unrelated to the secur-
ing of the evidence they obtained, and could not render that 
evidence inadmissible. 
(2] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search incident to 
an arrest cannot be justified in the absence of "reasonable 
cause" under Pen. Code, § 836, merely because it revealed that 
defendant was in fact guilty of a felony. 
(3] Arrest-Without Warrant.-An arrest cannot be justified 
under Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 1, when there is no evidence 
of anything apparent to the officer's senses before the arrest 
and search to indicate that defendant was committing or at-
tempting to commit a public offense in his presence. 
[4] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-Where there is no 
evidence of anything apparent to the officer's senses before the 
arrest and search to indicate that defendant was committing or 
attempting to commit a public offense in his presence the 
search may be justified only if it was incidental to a lawful 
arrest under Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3. 
[6] ld.-Time of Making.-If an arrest under Pen. Code, § 836, 
subd. 3, was lawful, the search incident thereto would not be un-
lawful merely because it preceded rather than followed the 
arrest. 
[6] ld.-Justification for.-Under Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3, author-
izing an officer to make an arrest when a felony has in fact been 
committed and he has reasonable cause for believing that 
the person arrested committed it, evidence other than that 
turned up in a search is present in any case in which the 
officer has reasonable cause to believe defendant guilty of a 
felony, and when his belief of defendant's guilt is based on 
reasonable cause and a felony has in fact been committed, 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 
et seq. 
[2] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq. j Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 409; [2,4-6] Searches 
n nd Seizures, § 1 j [3] Arrest, § 7; [7, 9] Arrest, § 12; [8] Criminal 
Law, § 1269. 
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not only are the requirements of subd. 3 satisfied, but a search 
incident to an arrest thereunder is reasonable. 
[7] Arrest - Without Warrant - Reasonable Cause.-Since the 
court and not the arresting officer must make the determination 
whether the officer's belief that a felony was being committed 
at the time of the arrest was based on reasonable cause, the 
officer must testify to the facts or information known to him 
on which his belief is based. 
[Sa, Sb] Criminal Law-Appeal-Who May Urge Error.-Where, 
at the time the prosecuting attorney in a narcotics case 
sought to establish the basis for the arresting officer's belief 
that a felony was being committed as justification for the 
arrest, defendant objected and the committing magistrate 
ruled that the matter should be gone into on cross-examination, 
at which time defendant limited the examination to a de-
termination that the officer had not personally witnessed any 
activity of defendant with regard to narcotics, defendant 
could not successfully contend on appeal that the evidence 
before the committing magistrate was necessarily illegally ob-
tained and therefore insufficient to support the information. 
[9] Arrest - Without Warrant - Reasonable Cause.-Reasonable 
cause to justify an arrest may consist of information obtained 
from others and is not limited to evidence that would be ad-
missible at the trial on the issue of guilt. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting motion to set aside an informa-
tion. David Coleman, Judge. Reversed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney 
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan and Lewis Watnick, Deputy 
District Attorneys, for Appellant. 
Alan Ross for Respondent. 
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-By information defendant was charged 
with one count of possessing heroin in violation of Health 
and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony. Her motion to set 
the information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was grantl!d 
on the ground that all of the evidence of the crime other than 
admissions was obtained by an illegal search of her person 
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At about 10 a. m. on May 2, 1955, three officers of the 
Los Angeles Police Department obtained the key to a hotel 
room from the manager of the hotel and entered the room 
and waited. About 11 a. m. defendant knocked on the door 
q,r made some signal. The officers opened the door and one 
of them grabbed defendant's hands and found two bindles 
of heroin in her right hand. One of the officers testified 
that he asked defendant "if she had any more stuff. She said 
no. That is all there was. I asked her how much was there 
and she said a gram and a half. I asked her where she got 
it and she said she scored it from a friend down on Second 
Street. I asked her what it cost her. She said $30." He 
also testified that he believed a felony was being committed 
at the time of the arrest. The prosecuting attorney then 
asked what reason he had for his belief, and defendant 
objected on the ground that the answer would be hearsay 
and a conclusion of the witness. The prosecuting attorney 
stated that he had a right to show that the arrest was legaJ 
and that the search was incident to the arrest, but the court 
indicated that since the officer had made a positive statement 
as to his belief, any question as to its validity should come 
from cross-examination. On cross-examination the officer was 
asked, "You personally did not witness any activity of this 
defendant with regard to narcotics before the date of this 
arrest, did you Y" He answered, "I did not." No further 
questions with respect to the basis of his belief were asked. 
It does not appear from the record who was the regular 
occupant of the hotel room where the officers waited. They 
did not have a search warrant or a warrant for defendant's 
arrest. 
[1] It should be noted at the outset that whether or not 
the officers were trespassers in the room where they waited 
for defendant is immaterial in this case. It does not appear 
that the room was searched, and even if it was, nothing that 
may have been found in the room was offered or introduced 
in evidence. It is apparent that the officers were waiting 
and watching for someone to enter the room. Since they 
had the cooperation of the manager of the hotel, however, 
any such person could have been apprehended just as well 
from some other vantage point nearby without committing 
any trespass, and thus their ability to arrest and search de-
fendant was not dependent on their presence in the room. 
Under these circumstances, the trespass, if any, was entirely 
unrelated and collateral to the securing of the evidence to 
which defendant objects, and it could not therefore render 
~'. 
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that evidence inadmissible. (Goldman v. United States, 316 
U.S. 129, 134-135 [62 8.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322]; see also 
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71 [64 S.Ct. 896, 
88 L.Ed. 1140] ; McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99-100 
[47 S.Ct. 259, 71 L.Ed. 556] ; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 
559, 563 [47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202].) 
The attorney general contends that the search in this case 
was incidental to a lawful arrest and was therefore reason-
able Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the search 
preceded the arrest and was not incidental thereto and that 
in any event the arrest was unlawful. 
[2] In People v. Brown, ante, p. 640 [290 P.2d 528], 
we held that a search incident to an arrest could not be 
justified in the absence of "reasonable cause" under Penal 
Code, section 836, merely because it revealed that defendant 
was in fact guilty of a felony. [3] We also held in that 
case that an arrest could not be justified under subdivision 1 
of section 836 when there was no evidence of anything ap-
parent to the officer's senses before the arrest and search 
that defendant was committing or attempting to commit a 
public offense in his presence. [4] Accordingly, since there 
was no such evidence in this case, the search may be justified 
only if it was incidental to a lawful arrest under subdivision 3 
of section 836. [5] If, however, an arrest under that sub-
division was lawful, the search incident thereto would not 
be unlawful merely because it preceded rather than followed 
the arrest. (People v. Simon, ante, p. 645 [290 P.2d 531].) 
[6] Section 836, subdivision 3, provides that an officer 
may make an arrest without a warrant "When a felony has 
in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for be-
lieving the person arrested to have committed it." 
Defendant contends that to justify a search incident to 
an arrest under this subdivision there must be evidence, other 
than any turned up in the search, that a felony has in fact 
been committed. Such evidence is present in any case in 
which the· officer has reasonable cause to believe defendant 
guilty of a felony. When his belief of defendant's guilt is 
based on reasonable cause and a felony has in fact been 
committed, not only are the requirements of subdivision 3 
satisfied, but a search incident to an arrest thereunder is 
reasonable. (See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581", 591 
[68 8.Ct. 222, 92 I..J.Ed 210] ; Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 15 I6S S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436] j In re Dizon, 41 
) 
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Ca1.2d 756, 761-762 [264 P.2d 513]; ct., People v. Brown, 
ante, p. 640 [290 P.2d 528].) 
[7] In the present case one of the arresting officers testi-
fied that he believed a felony was being committed at the 
time of the arrest. Since the court and not the officer must 
make the determination whether the officer's belief is based 
upon reasonable cause, the officer must testify to the facts 
or information known to him on which his belief is based. 
(United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 719; United States 
v. Heitner) 149 F.2d 105, 106-107; see also Grau v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 124, 127 [53 8.0t. 38, 77 L.Ed. 212] ; Byars 
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 [47 8.0t. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520] ; 
People v. Tarantino, ante, p. 590 [290 P.2d 505]; Michel 
v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199, 206 [205 P. 113].) [Sa] Under the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, however, defendant is 
not in a position to challenge the failure of the record to 
establish the basis for the officer's belief. When the prosecut-
ing attorney sought to establish that basis, defendant objected 
and the committing magistrate ruled that the matter should 
be gone into on cross-examination. At that time defendant 
limited the examination to a determination that the officer 
had not personally witnessed any activity of defendant with 
regard to narcotics. [9] It is settled, however, that reasonable 
cause to justify an arrest may consist of information obtained 
from others and is not limited to evidence that would be 
admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt. (Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171-176 [69 8.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 
1879]; United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650, 652; 
Aitken v. White, 93 Cal.App.2d 134, 145 [208 P.2d 788]; 
Oook v. Singer Sewing Machine 00.,138 Cal.App. 418, 422-423 
[32 P.2d 430].) [Sb] Thus in the present case it is entirely 
possible that the officer's belief that defendant had narcotics 
in her possession was fully justified by reliable information 
obtained by him from others in carrying out his duties. Since 
defendant successfully prevented the prosecution from pre-
senting such evidence, if any, she cannot now contend that 
the evidence before the committing magistrate was necessarily 
illegally obtained and therefore insufficient to support the 
information. 
The order is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J. pro tem.,· concurred. 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
